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Leading virtue epistemologists (e.g. Sosa 1991; 2007; 2009 and Greco 1993; 2010) have spilled plenty of 
ink in analysing the nature and place of (to use Baehr’s terminology) intellectual faculties (like vision and 
memory) in epistemology. These cognitive faculties are thought to qualify as intellectual virtues in part 
because they are reliably truth-conducive, and (as Sosa and Greco argue) they deserve a prominent place 
within the projects of traditional epistemology: we can (they argue) analyse knowledge in terms of these 
reliable faculties. 
Jason Baehr’s The Inquiring Mind is an extremely clearly written book that, in an admirably 
systematic way, challenges this picture on several fronts: as Baehr notes, virtue epistemologists of a 
reliabilist bent too often overlook the importance of character virtues (as opposed to mere reliable 
faculties) in successful inquiry. Intellectual character virtues include such traits as open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, intellectual integrity, perceptiveness, creativity, fair-mindedness, inquisitiveness and 
curiosity. 
Given the comparative dearth of work on character virtues in epistemology, two guiding 
questions are deserving of attention: firstly, is the concept of intellectual character virtue (hereafter 
intellectual virtue) useful for addressing (one or more) problems in traditional epistemology (i.e. the 
analysis of knowledge)? Secondly, can the concept of intellectual virtue form the basis of an approach to 
epistemology that is independent of traditional epistemology? 
These broad questions guide the direction of the monograph, and provide a helpful way to cut up 
the landscape.  Baehr labels ‘Conservative VE’ the view that the first question should be answered 
affirmatively, Autonomous VE, the view that the second should. He notes there is scope for strong and 
weak forms of both. Within Conservative VE, there is scope for arguing that the concept of intellectual 
virtue is useful for addressing problems in traditional epistemology by playing either (i) a central and 
fundamental role (i.e. Strong conservative VE), or (ii)  by playing a secondary or background role in these 
projects (i.e. Weak Conservative VE). Similarly, one could endorse Autonomous VE by holding either that 
an independent focus on intellectual character and virtues (i) should replace or supplant traditional 
epistemology (Strong Autonomous VE) or (ii)  complement traditional epistemology (Weak Autonomous 
VE). 
Baehr endorses the weaker version of both Conservative and Autonomous VE and so thinks that 
the concept of intellectual virtue should play a secondary role in traditional epistemology while at the 
same constituting an independent research program that complements (rather than replaces) traditional 
epistemology.  
Why think intellectual virtue is stands to play merely a secondary background role in traditional 
epistemology? After some helpful introduction and set-up in Chatpers 1 and 2, Baehr uses Chapter 3 to 
argue for just this point (and so to reject Strong Conservative VE.) As Baehr sees it, intellectual virtue 
deserves a central place in epistemology if, and only if, we can provide a plausible virtue-theoretic 
analysis of knowledge. By considering Zagzebski’s (1996) attempt to do just this, Baehr concludes the 
prospects are not at all good--satisfaction of a virtue condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
knowledge--and so Strong Conservative VE can be dismissed. 
 Nonetheless, he thinks, traditional epistemology needs the concept of intellectual virtue in the 
background, specifically, in order to plausibly account for the nature of epistemic justification. Baehr’s 
positive argument for Weak Conservative VE spans Chapters 4 and 5; in Chapter 4, he argues that 
reliabilist accounts of justification will (on their own terms) need to make room for intellectual character 
virtues in order to account for ‘much of the knowledge that we as humans care most about’ (p. 67). 
Chapter 5, one of the most engaging chapters in the book, argues that, in the absence of an 
intellectual virtue codicil, evidentialism is inadequate as an account of epistemic justification. One 
particularly interesting variety of case that motivates such a codicil involves defective inquiry. Suppose 
(for example) that my belief that p is well supported, but that the reason my belief is well supported traces 
back to defects in my intellectual character (e.g. intellectual laziness or tunnel vision, in my acquisition of 
my evidence). As Baehr suggests, ‘Perhaps there is some epistemic value simply in having a belief that 
fits one’s evidence--regardless of whether this evidence is the result of defective inquiry’ (p. 72) but he 
denies that whatever justification they do instantiate is ‘particularly worthy or significant.’  
Having made his positive case for Weak Conservative VE, Baehr shifts his focus from the place 
of intellectual virtue in traditional epistemology to the concept of intellectual virtue in its own right. 
Chapter 6 is particularly important as Baehr here articulates his novel account of intellectual virtue, which 
is a personal worth conception of intellectual virtue. Baehr thinks, generally speaking, that a person is 
good or better (qua person) to the extent that she is ‘positively oriented toward or loves what is good and 
is negatively oriented towards or hates what is bad’ (p. 97); narrowing the scope of this position, we can 
define the basis of personal intellectual worth as follows: a subject S is intellectually good or better qua 
person to the extent that S is positively oriented toward or ‘loves’ what is intellectually good and is 
negatively oriented toward or ‘hates’ what is intellectually bad (p. 101). With reference to this position 
about what accounts for an agent’s personal intellectual worth, Baehr articulates the conditions under 
which a trait qualifies as an intellectual virtue as follows: ‘an intellectual virtue is a character trait that 
contributes to its possessor’s personal intellectual worth on account of its involving a positive 
psychological orientation toward epistemic goods’ (p. 102). 
Baehr proceeds in Chapter 8 to defend the personal worth conception of the good against rival 
positions, and in Chapter 9 and 10, he explores (in some detail) the nature of two particular intellectual 
virtues: open-mindedness and intellectual courage. In his closing chapter, Baehr offers some 
considerations against Strong Autonomous VE (as defended by Kvanvig 1992) and proposes some further 
research projects in accord with Weak Autonomous VE.  
 Overall, Baehr’s book should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in virtue epistemology. 
Character virtues, and their place in epistemology, have never been explored before in such a systematic 
way, and Baehr’s presentational style should be emulated. 
 I have several critical worries, but they should be viewed as suggestions for improvement and not 
as issues I have with the direction of his project more generally. I’ll mention briefly two specific worries. 
The first concerns his personal-worth conception of intellectual virtue, the second highlights a potential 
regress worry for his account of open-mindedness (and when it should qualify as an intellectual virtue).. 
A worry I have for Baehr’s account of intellectual virtue is that the positive psychological 
orientation condition is too strong. Suppose I don’t reflect on intellectual goods, per se. I do, however, 
want (for instance) to know who won the game, where my keys are, whether the Baigong Pipes are man-
made and how Fermat’s last theorem was proven. Generalizing, suppose the motivations that drive my 
inquiries are always particular in this way, and involve no psychological orientation toward any more 
general epistemic good or goods. It strikes, me that I could carry on this way with not a moment’s 
reflection on truth or epistemic goods, as such, (and without any positive psychological orientation to 
them) and nonetheless exhibit intellectual virtue in my inquiries, so long as my inquiries were conducted 
with the appropriate sort of intellectual responsibility. Accordingly, Baehr’s psychological requirement 
makes for an account of intellectual virtue that is overly restrictive. 
I want to turn now to Baehr’s discussion of open-mindedness, which includes (i) both an account 
of open-mindedness, and (ii) an account of the conditions under which open-mindedness is intellectually 
virtuous. His account of the nature of open-mindedness states: ‘An open minded person is 
characteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in 
order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint’ (p. 152). When is open-
mindedness virtuous? He claims ‘A person S’s engaging in the activity characteristic of open-mindedness 
under circumstances C is intellectually virtuous only if it is reasonable for S to believe that engaging in 
this activity in C may be helpful for reaching the truth’ (p. 160). And finally, an account of such 
reasonableness: ‘Its being ‘reasonable’ for S to think that being open-minded in C may be helpful for 
reaching the truth is generally a function of the comparative strength of S’s grounds concerning: (1) P 
itself; (2) S’s own reliability relative to the propositional domain to which P belongs; and (3) the 
reliability of the source of the argument or evidence against P’ (161). Surely, one fails to be open-minded 
in C, vis-a-vis p, if not also, a the same time, open-minded about (1) P itself; (2) S’s own reliability 
relative to the propositional domain to which P belongs; and (3) the reliability of the source of the 
argument or evidence against P. But then a regress looms:  for S to be open-minded about (1-3), it would  
(on Baehr’s view) have to be reasonable for S to think that being open-minded about whether (1-3) would 
be helpful for reaching the truth (about 1-3), and this reasonableness will be a function of a further (1*-
3*), about which S would have to be open-minded in order to be open-minded about (1-3), and so on, ad 
infinitum.  
Baehr may well have the resources to non-circularly get around this regress for open-mindedness 
(and also, perhaps, to avoid the worry I sketched for his positive psychological condition on intellectual 
virtue). Regardless, though, there is much of merit in this book, and I hope it receives the attention it 
deserves. 
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